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INTRODUCING FEMINIST JURISPRUDENCE:
AN ANALYSIS OF OKLAHOMA'S
SEDUCTION STATUTE
Linda J. Lacey*
It wasn't God who made honky-tonk angels
As you said in the words of your song
Too many married men think that they're still single
That has caused many a good girl to go wrong.1
I. INTRODUCTION
It is a crime in Oklahoma for a man to seduce a woman of "chaste
character" with false promises of marriage.2 When I first discovered this
statute eight years ago, I planned to write a law review article arguing
* Professor of Law, University of Tulsa College of Law; J.D., University of California at Los
Angeles (1978); B.S., University of Wisconsin at Madison (1967). I would like to thank Leslie
Bender, Marianne Blair, Stephen Feldman, and Gilbert Gaynor for their useful comments. I am
particularly grateful to Mary Beth Minor-Morrissey for her exceptionally thorough and thoughtful
editorial assistance, to Stephen Ward for his patience and supportive attitude toward the feminist
jurisprudence symposium, and to Laura Gonsalves, whose vision and energy made the entire project
possible.
1. This song, written and sung by Kitty Wells, the first prominent woman in country-western
music, was a response to a popular song God Must Have Made Honky-Tonk Angels, a bitter and
misogynist denunciation of women in general. Wells' reply contains a central insight of feminist
jurisprudence: that men, through their "songs," characterize women in a way that suits their own
purposes and is drawn from their own experiences, yet purports to be universal.
Most traditional country-western music continues to be sexist (a classic example is Paul Anka's
She's Having My Baby), but there are a few exceptions like Loretta Lynn's Now I've Got the Pill in
which the singer describes her husband as a strutting rooster and tells him "you've lost yourself a
brooder hen, cause now I've got the pill" and Bobby Bare's Ten, a classic put-down in which a
macho type approaches a woman who he begins to describe as a "nine" and is met with her numeri-
cal analysis of his own physical attributes.
2. OKLA. STAT. tit. 21, § 1120 (1983):
Every person who, under promise of marriage, seduces and has illicit connection with any-
unmarried female of previous chaste character, is punishable by imprisonment in the peni-
tentiary not exceeding five (5) years, or by imprisonment in a county jail not exceeding one
(1) year, or by a fine not exceeding One Thousand Dollars ($1,000.00) or by both such fine
and imprisonment. R.L. 1910, § 2423.
Id.
OKLA. STAT. tit. 21, § 1121 (1983) allows a defense for the crime: subsequent marriage, but
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that the law is antiquated and unconstitutional. As my readings in legal
literature grew more sophisticated, I dismissed the topic as too obvious,
not the type of subject which would impress my colleagues with my orig-
inality and brilliance. Furthermore, I could no longer write an article
discussing with great seriousness constitutional doctrines that I have
come to regard as a sham.3 Yet, for reasons I could not completely artic-
ulate, I continued to find the statute interesting. When a Tulsa Law
Journal editor suggested that I write an article for this symposium which
would help explain feminist jurisprudence to readers unfamiliar with the
genre, I decided to use the statute as a focus for my discussion. In this
Article, once I have given a broad description of feminist jurisprudence
and its three major schools of thought,4 I will attempt a feminist analysis
of the Oklahoma law, looking at the statute as writers in each school
might view it.
II. WHAT IS FEMINIST JURISPRUDENCE ANYWAY?
Before we can define "feminist jurisprudence," we need to define
"feminist." There are a number of misconceptions about what it means
to be a feminist, and as a result the word arouses a great deal of hostility.
As Leslie Bender writes:
Feminists are portrayed as bra-burners, man-haters, sexists, and cas-
trators .... We are characterized as bitchy, demanding, aggressive,
confrontational, and uncooperative, as well as overly sensitive and hu-
morless. No wonder many women, particularly many career women,
OKLA. STAT. tit. 21, § 1122 (1983) provides for penalties if the wife married under these conditions
is abandoned within two years.
Although the law appears to be seldom, if ever, enforced today, as recently as 1951 a man was
fined $550 under the statute. Holland v. State, 93 Okla. Crim. 413, 229 P.2d 215 (1951). In sus-
taining his conviction, the appellate judge stated that the defendant "appeared to be very arrogant
and boastful with a brazen disregard for all decency." Id. at 422, 229 P.2d at 220.
In Butts v. State, 12 Okla. Crim. 391, 157 P. 704 (1916) the Court stated that the burden of
proof regarding the woman's chastity was on the prosecution. In contrast to criminal law, the tort of
seduction has been abolished. OKLA. STAT. tit. 76, § 8.1 (1976).
3. This attitude is mainly Mark Tushnet's fault, see, eg., MARK TUSHNET, RED, WHITE,
AND BLUE (1988); Mark Tushnet, Anti-Formalism in Recent Constitutional Theory, 83 MICH. L.
REv. 1502 (1985); Mark Tushnet, Following the Rules Laid Down: A Critique of Interpretivism and
Neutral Principles, 96 HARV. L. REv. 781 (1983); Mark Tushnet, Darkness on the Edge of Town:
The Contributions of John Hart Ely to Constitutional Theory, 89 YALE L.J. 1037 (1980), but I seri-
ously doubt if anyone who cares about minority rights, even those not as influenced as I am by
critical legal studies, could continue to have any respect for the current Supreme Court's manipula-
tion of constitutional doctrines after reading its blatantly homophobic decision in Bowers v. Hard-
wick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986). For a particularly perceptive feminist discussion of this case, see Lynne
Henderson, Legality and Empathy, 85 MICH. L. REv. 1574, 163849 (1987).
4. See infra notes 36-89 and accompanying text. The footnotes of this Article should also
serve as a bibliography for readers'who want to know more about feminist jurisprudence.
[Vol. 25:775
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struggle to distance themselves from the opprobrium appended to the
label. 'I am not a feminist; I'm safe; I'm ok, is the message they seek to
convey. And for every woman that cowers from the word, even more
men recoil and raise defenses that cloud their vision and deafen their
ears.
5
The truth about feminism is far less threatening than most men be-
lieve. Although there are many types of feminists,6 nearly every person
who is a feminist believes in two basic propositions:
1. Our society today is patriarchal, in the sense that it has been
shaped by, and continues to be dominated by, white men. As a result of
this patriarchal structure, women do not have as much power as men, are
not treated in the same way as men, do not enjoy the same degree of
control over their lives as men, and in general are relegated to a
subordinate status.
2. Women's current subordination in our society is not desirable.
Women should have as much power as men and enjoy equal opportuni-
ties in every aspect of their lives.
As should be clear from the above description, feminists can hold a
wide variety of views on other political subjects. Feminists can be either
men or women,7 Republicans or Democrats, capitalists or socialists.
While all feminists basically agree with the general propositions I have
articulated, there are many different opinions about corollary proposi-
tions. Feminists disagree as to exactly what laws, practices, etc., consti-
tute examples of illegitimate patriarchy, and what methods should be
used to establish "equality" for women. For example, many prominent
feminists, most importantly Catharine MacKinnon, support laws re-
stricting pornography; others strongly oppose these laws.8 There is even
dissension about whether formal "equality" is the proper goal of
feminism.9
Opposition to feminism is also not unilateral. Opponents of femi-
nism fall into two broad camps, each of which disagrees with one, but
5. Leslie Bender, A Lawyer's Primer on Feminist Theory and Tort, 38 J. LEGAL EDuc. 3
(1988).
6. For example, there are libertarian feminists, socialist feminists, metaphysical feminists, etc.
See id. at 5.
7. Although most of the people writing about feminist jurisprudence are women, a few men
like Kenneth Karst in Woman's Constitution, 1984 DUKE L.J. 447, and Cass Sunstein in Feminism
and Legal Theory (Book Review), 101 HARv. L. REV. 826 (1988), have made important contribu-
tions to the genre.
8. See infra notes 84-86 and accompanying text.
9. See infra notes 61-62 and accompanying text.
1990]
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not both, of these propositions. The "traditional woman" advocates es-
sentially acknowledge that women are not treated the same as men in
today's society, but try to refute the assertion that this disparity is unde-
sirable. To them, women properly belong in a "separate sphere,""0 not
necessarily inferior to men's sphere, but decidedly different. They argue
that women are happiest and are fulfilling the role for which they are best
equipped when they do not work outside the home, but devote their time
to full-time housekeeping and/or child-raising. They also assert that wo-
men are naturally submissive to men and prefer to take orders from their
husbands. Many supporters of the "traditional woman" approach are
also members of the religious right.I They believe that their concept of a
separate sphere for women is part of God's plan, citing biblical passages
like this:
Wives, submit yourselves unto your own husbands, as unto the Lord.
For the husband is the head of the wife, even as Christ is the head of
the Church .... 12
To these advocates, who belong to organizations like Concerned Women
for America,"3 feminists are "moral perverts, godless humanists and ene-
mies of every decent society."14
The "ideological non-feminists" purport to agree with proposition
two, that women should enjoy equal opportunities with men, but deny
the continuing existence of a patriarchy. They assert that while women
10. For a comprehensive discussion of the historical relegation of women to a separate sphere,
see Frances Olsen, The Family and the Market: A Study ofIdeology and Legal Reform, 96 HARV. L.
REv. 1497, 1498-1501 (1983). See also Nadine Taub & Elizabeth Schneider, Perspectives on Wo-
men's Subordination and the Role of Law, in THE POLITmCS OF LAW 117 (David Kairys, ed. 1982).
The classic example of the legal system's view of women's separate sphere is the much-quoted lan-
guage from Bradwell v. Illinois, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 130, 139-141 (1872) (Bradley, J., concurring).
Rejecting a claim that the state could not ban women from the practice of law, Bradley stated:
Man is, or should be, woman's protector and defender. The natural and proper timidity
and delicacy which belongs to the female sex evidently unfits it for many of the occupations
of civil life. The constitution of the family organization, which is founded in the divine
ordinance, as well as in the nature of things, indicates the domestic sphere as that which
properly belongs to the domain and functions of womanhood .... The paramount destiny
and mission of woman are to fulfil [sic] the noble and benign offices of wife and mother.
Id. at 141.
11. See generally POLITICS OF WOMEN'S SPIRITUALITY (1982) [hereinafter SPIRITUALITY];
Amy Underwood, unpublished University of Tulsa College of Law seminar paper.
12. Ephesians 5:22-23.
13. This group, founded in 1979, now boasts over 1,800 local Prayer/Action chapters, and
allied itself with Phyllis Schaffly's Eagle Action Forum to defeat a proposed Vermont ERA amend-
ment in 1986.
14. SPIRITUALITY, supra note 11, at 470. In her book, RIGHT WING WOMEN (1983), Andrea
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may have been discriminated against in the past, laws and attitudes have
changed, and today women can, and do, successfully compete with men.
Thus feminism is either antiquated and unnecessary or feminists are
"special interest" lobbyists who seek to give women unfair advantages
over men through mechanisms such as affirmative action.1 5 Many wo-
men law students who have never personally experienced discrimination
share this attitude. 16
Just as it is inaccurate to generalize about "what feminists think"
beyond some basic propositions, it is also inaccurate to generalize about
feminist jurisprudence. 7 However, although feminist jurisprudence can
15. A classic example of this viewpoint is expressed eloquently in Richard Posner's recent arti-
cle, Richard Posner, Conservative Feminism, 1989 U. Cm. LEGAL F. 191. Posner begins by ac-
knowledging the perspective that conservatives reject feminism. He admits that "[s]ome brands of
conservatism do; many social and religious conservatives believe that a woman's place is in the
home." Id. at 191. But he argues that "conservatives in the classic liberal tradition," such as John
Stuart Mill, who he describes as a "distinguished feminist," are highly supportive of the movement,
because they oppose government action which restricts women's choices. Id. at 191. Posner de-
scribes conservative feminism as "the idea that women are entitled to political, legal, social, and
economic equality to men, in the framework of a lightly regulated market economy." Id. at 191-92.
Posner's article is a fascinating discussion of feminist issues, which deserves a far more extensive
analysis than I am able to give in this limited space. I will note, however, one rather obvious incon-
sistency in Posner's remarks. After describing himself as a libertarian and devoting a great deal of
time to the argument that government activism is not desirable in issues affecting women (rejecting
among other things government-financed day care centers, id. at 201-02, and comparable worth, id.
at 202-03), Posner completely fudges on the issue of abortion, stating that "as the moral issue both
depends critically on the status to be assigned the fetus and is central to the controversy... eco-
nomic or libertarian analysis will not resolve the controversy." Id. at 208-09.
The conclusion that economic analysis cannot resolve the diflicult issues that abortion raises is,
of course, true. But it is striking that Posner does not exhibit this totally uncharacteristic modesty
regarding economic analysis in other morally complex areas of the law, such as rape, adoption,
defendant's rights, the death penalty, freedom of religion, and the establishment of religion.
16. They may be in for a rude awakening when they enter law practice in Oklahoma. A 1980
University of Tulsa College of Law graduate describes herself as initially sharing the attitude of
many women law students: "I thought even if there was sexism, I could overcome it. I was going to
be such a good lawyer that I wouldn't have any problems." Two years later, after being told, among
other things, that she couldn't practice labor law because she was a woman, she left Oklahoma
private practice in disgust. Letter from L.F. (June 14, 1989).
17. Many women authors who discuss feminist theory are troubled by the term "feminist juris-
prudence." For example, Robin West states that "the phrase 'feminist jurisprudence' is a conceptual
anomaly," but concludes that this does not mean that feminist jurisprudence does not exist. Robin
West, Jurisprudence and Gender, 55 U. CHI. L. REv. 1, 4 (1988). Regardless of its nomenclature,
feminist jurisprudence is considered one of the most important movements in legal scholarship to-
day. It is increasingiy prominent in major law reviews, many of which have devoted or are devoting
symposium issues to the subject. See, eg., Feminism in the Law: Theory, Practice, and Criticism,
1989 U. CHI. LEGAL F.; Voices of Experience" New Responses to Gender Discourse, 24 HARv. C.R.-
C.L. L. REv. 1 (1989). It has been the subject of a number of panels at the annual meeting of the
Association of American Law Schools. See Lucinda Finley, The Nature of Domination and the
Nature of Women: Reflections on Feminism Unmodified (Book Review), 82 Nw. U.L. REv. 352 n.1
(1988).
There is no doubt that the genre has attracted a great deal of attention today, but this attention
is not an unmixed blessing. Deborah Rhode graphically describes a situation many women in
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be subdivided into at least three different "schools," which I shall de-
scribe in detail later,"8 there is a general consensus that feminist jurispru-
dence is centered around an analysis of women's position in a patriarchal
society and the methods of eliminating patriarchy.19 Lucinda Finley ex-
plains: "[t]he purpose and the practice of feminist theory is to name, ex-
pose, and eliminate the unequal position of women in society."2 In a
similar vein, Leslie Bender states: "[t]he primary task of feminist schol-
ars is to awaken women and men to the insidious ways in which patri-
archy distorts all of our lives."'21 Robin West has described two aspects
academia face-an encounter with a "colleague" who "would like a five-minute summary over
lunch. The subtle or not so subtle implication is that he has heard 'you girls think differently,' and
he is interested in knowing a little about why. And a little is what he has in mind. Bibliographic
suggestions will not suffice." Deborah Rhode, The "Woman's Point of View," 38 J. LEGAL EDUC,
39, 45 (1988). Rhode's comments also illustrate the potential dangers of cultural feminism. See
infra notes 36-56 and accompanying text.
Additionally, as Martha Minow observes, the genre has not yet been seriously criticized in the
law review literature. Martha Minow, Beyond Universality, 1989 U. CHi. LEGAL F. 115, 116-17.
She is concerned by this silence because she believes that "[feminism] deserves the minimum degree
of respect that is registered by serious criticism." Id. at 117.
18. There have been a number of attempts to identify types of feminist thought, and no single
author is in exact agreement as to names or descriptions of their categories. Cass Sunstein, supra
note 7, at 827, states that there are three principal "strands" of feminist legal theory, which he
identifies as "difference," "different voice" and "dominance" approach. My three categories-lib-
eral feminism, cultural feminism, and radical feminism roughly correspond to his three categories,
although my description of "liberal feminists" varies somewhat from his description of "difference"
feminists. Robin West, supra note 17, identifies two schools, cultural feminists and radical feminists.
I have adopted these names and my description of those two groups is similar to hers. As Joan
Williams notes in Deconstructing Gender, 87 MICH. L. REv. 797, 798 n.2 (1989), West has implicitly
dismissed liberal or "sameness" feminists, as Williams calls them, from her description of feminist
thought.
19. Any sophisticated description of feminist jurisprudence must also include a discussion of
the relationship between feminist jurisprudence and critical legal studies (CLS), since the two are
often incorrectly lumped together. Both feminist jurisprudence and CLS challenge the illegitimate
hierarchy of the status quo. References to patriarchy as an illegitimate hierarchy are common in
CLS literature. However, for critical legal scholars, patriarchy, like racism, is just one of many evils
in the status quo and the majority of CLS jurisprudence has not focused primarily on patriarchy.
Many, although by no means all, feminists in legal academia, such as Frances Olsen and Mary Joe
Frug, share other principles of CLS. These scholars describe themselves as "Fem-Crits." See gener-
ally Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Feminist Legal Theory, Critical Legal Studies, and Legal Education or
"The Fem-Crits Go to Law School, " 38 J. LEGAL EDUC. 61 (1988). But, as I discuss in the text, infra
notes 57-65 and accompanying text, some feminist authors like Wendy Williams and Sylvia Law are
also liberals and do not accept the CLS critique of liberalism. Other feminists like Robin West do
not accept the rejection of rights analysis which is central to CLS theory, West, supra note 17, at 55.
Feminist scholars who are also women of color, like KimberlI Crenshaw, in Race, Reform, and
Retrenchment Transformation and Legitimation in Antidiscrimination Law, 101 HARV. L. REV.
1331 (1988) criticize both CLS and feminist jurisprudence as not reflecting the experience of persons
of color. (See infra note 25 for a more extensive discussion of critiques of feminist jurisprudence
from the perspective of women of color.) For a comprehensive examination of the relationship of
critical legal studies and feminist jurisprudence, see Robin West, Deconstructing the CLS-Fem Split,
2 Wis. WOMEN'S L.J. 85 (1985).
20. Finley, supra note 17, at 353.
21. Bender, supra note 5, at 8.
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of feminist jurisprudence:
The first project is the unmasking and critiquing of the patriarchy be-
hind purportedly ungendered law and theory, or, put differently, the
uncovering of what we might call 'patriarchal jurisprudence' from
under the protective covering of 'jurisprudence' .... The second pro-
ject in which feminist legal theorists engage might be called 'recon-
structive jurisprudence.' The last twenty years have seen a substantial
amount of feminist law reform, primarily in the areas of rape, sexual
harassment, reproductive freedom, and pregnancy rights in the
workplace.2 2
A secondary theme in many works of feminist jurisprudence is the
rejection of abstract universalities23 and "objective" standards.24 Femi-
nists recognize that abstract statements about human nature inevitably
ignore differences and ultimately are insensitive to those outside of the
experience of the person making the generalizations.25 We also reject
22. West, supra note 17, at 60-61.
23. One of the most powerful criticisms of abstraction occurs in Mai Matsuda's discussion of
JOHN RAwVLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE (1971), in which she argues that his methodology ultimately
results in his failure to present a meaningful theory ofjustice. Mar Matsuda, Liberal Jurisprudence
and Abstracted Visions of Human Nature" A Feminist Critique of Rawls' Theory of Justice, 16 N.M.L.
REV. 613 (1986).
24. See, eg., Ann Scales, The Emergence of Feminist Jurisprudence: An Essay, 95 YALE L.J.
1373 (1986); Bender, supra note 5; Matsuda, supra note 23. This theme is particularly prominent
among the work of cultural feminists, see infra notes 36-56 and accompanying text, but is also
important to radical feminists, see infra notes 66-89 and accompanying text. Many liberal feminists
accept its validity. See infra notes 57-65 and accompanying text. In a provocative article, Joan
Williams, supra note 18, at 805-08, criticizes the tendency of cultural feminists to implicitly assume
that they originated the concept of rejection of universalities and objectivity. She characterizes this
theory as a "new epistemology" which centers around "rejection of an absolute truth accessible
through rigorous, logical manipulation of abstractions," id. at 805, and states this epistemology has
been developed primarily by men such as Martin Heidegger and Ludwig Wittgenstein. Id. at 806.
25. Obviously, this insensitivity has the potential to exclude the experiences of both women and
racial minorities. Feminist jurisprudence attempts to avoid these concerns, but it certainly does not
always succeed. Although there are important feminist authors in legal academia who are also wo-
men of color, including, but certainly not limited to Taunya Banks, infra note 28; Crenshaw, supra
note 19; Judy Scales-Trent, Black Women and the Constitution: Finding Our Place, Asserting Our
Rights, 24 HARv. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 9 (1989); Matsuda, supra note 23; and Patricia Williams, The
Obliging Shell: An Informal Essay on Formal Equal Opportunity, 87 MICH. L. REV. 2128 (1989), the
majority of feminist authors are white and middle class, and inevitably their writings are subject to
justified criticism of being racist and class-based. Kimberl6 Crenshaw uses the experience of Black
women to demonstrate how both feminist jurisprudence and anti-discrimination law "treat race and
gender as mutually exclusive categories of experience and analysis." Kimberl6 Crenshaw,
Demarginalizing the Intersection of Race and Sex: A Black Feminist Critique of Antidiscrimination
Doctrine, Feminist Theory and Antiracist Politics, 1989 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 139. In her chapter titled,
Racism and Feminism: The Issue of Accountability, bell hooks gives a scathing indictment of the
womens' movement's failure to include the concerns of black women and its refusal to address issues
of class. B. HOOKS, AIN'T I A WoMAN 119-58 (1981). She concludes:
[w]omen's liberationists, white and black, will always be at odds with one another as long
as our idea of liberation is based on having the power white men have .... Resolution of
the conflict between black and white women cannot begin until all women acknowledge
7
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"objective" standards because we understand that what is called objectiv-
ity actually only reflects the viewpoint of the persons who always have
control over language and laws-middle-class white males. This truth is
particularly evident when "objectivity" appears in the form of the mythi-
cal The Average Reasonable Person (TARP). Feminists recognize that
despite surface attempts at gender neutrality, the "new" 20th century
TARP is really just the "old" 19th century Average Reasonable Man.26
Instead of false objectivity, feminists offer the slogan, "the personal
is the political."27 This statement has different meanings to different peo-
ple, but I see it as a response by women who have tried to rely upon their
own feelings about things that have actually happened to them-how it
feels to be whistled at, or ignored in law school classrooms,28 for exam-
ple-to make statements about political, social, or legal topics, only to be
told, "that's not relevant, that's just your personal experience."2 9 We
that a feminist movement which is both racist and classist is a mere sham, a cover-up for
women's continued bondage to materialist patriarchal principles, and passive acceptance of
the status quo.
Id. at 156-57. See also ADRIENNE RICH, Disloyal to Civilization; Feminism, Racism, Gynephobia, in
ON LiEs, SECRETS AND SILENCE (1979). Additionally, Patricia Cain has accused feminist jurispru-
dence of excluding the experience of lesbians. See Patricia Cain, Feminist Jurisprudence: Grounding
the Theories, 4 BERKELY WOMEN'S L. J. 191 (1990).
26. And like the "new" and "old" Nixon, he's unpalatable in any form. Leslie Bender, supra
note 5, provides examples of the gender bias of TARP in tort law. See also Peter Bell, Analyzing
Tort Law: The Flawed Practice of Neocontract, 44 U. MrAMI L. REV. (forthcoming 1990); Carl
Tobias, Gender Issues and the Prosser, Wade and Schwartz Torts Casebook, 18 GOLDEN GATE U.L.
REV. 495 (1988). Mary Joe Frug examines gender bias in a contracts casebook. Mary Joe Frug, Re-
Reading Contracts-A Feminist Analysis of a Contracts Casebook, 34 AM. U.L. REV. 1065 (1985). See
also Clare Dalton, An Essay in the Deconstruction of Contract Doctrine, 94 YALE L.J. 997 (1985). In
criminal law, the difference between TARP and women's experience is particularly obvious in the
area of self-defense, especially for battered women. See Dolores Donovan & Stephanie Wildman, Is
the Reasonable Man Obsolete? A Critical Perspective on Self-Defense and Provocation, 14 Loy. L.A.
L. REv. 435 (1981). Richard Posner blithely ignores this critcism, stating for example that Bender's
analysis of tort law "misunderstands the significance of the 'reasonable man' (or as it is now more
often and more appropriately referred to, the 'reasonable person') rule in tort law." Posner, supra
note 15, at 213.
27. See generally Scales, supra note 24; Karst, supra note 7; Matsuda, supra note 23 for discus.
sions of this slogan.
28. For a study of the law school classroom's effect on women, see Taunya Banks, Gender Bias
in the Classroom, 38 J. LEGAL EDUC. 137 (1988). Banks states:
many women students still perceive the law school environment as hostile to women. Be-
cause the agenda is set by and run by white middle-class males, women, like racial minori-
ties, often feel alienated in the classroom. As a result, they become silent in class. They
remain silent because they believe that their views carry no weight. They are silent because
they believe that women are largely ignored or invisible in law school classrooms.
Id. at 138-39 (citations omitted). See also Stephanie Wildman, The Question of Silence: Techniques
to Ensure Full Class Participation, 38 J. LEGAL EDUC. 147 (1988).
29. For a discussion of a law school class which emphasized, rather than denigrated, personal
stories, see Patricia Cain, Teaching Feminist Legal Theory at Texas: Listening to Difference and
Exploring Connections, 38 J. LEGAL EDUC. 165 (1988).
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have come to reject the concept that what happens to us is "just" per-
sonal and useless for building larger theories. As Mari Matsuda con-
cludes, "what happens in the daily lives of real people has political
content in the same way as does what we normally think of as politics-
the structure of economic systems and governments." 3 Moreover, by
telling our "merely personal" stories, women can recognize both our dif-
ferences and our commonality. This emphasis on personal insights and
experiences is a crucial part of the methodology of feminist jurispru-
dence.31 It can be far more effective than traditional abstract methodol-
ogy; Susan Estrich opens her article on rape in a way no one who reads it
can ever forget:
Eleven years ago, a man held an ice pick to my throat and said: "Push
over, shut up, or I'll kill you." I did what he said, but couldn't stop
crying. A hundred years later, I jumped out of my car as he drove
away. 2
Much of feminist jurisprudence is also communitarian, emphasizing
ideals of cooperation and connection instead of competition and auton-
omy. It can be highly idealistic-my favorite description is Mari
Matsuda's:
The feminist utopia looks something like this: it is a place without
hierarchy, where children are nourished and told they are special,
where gardens grow wheat and roses too, where the desire to excel at
the expense of another is thought odd, where love is possible, and
where the ordinary tragedies of human life are cushioned by the care
30. Matsuda, supra note 23, at 618.
31. See generally Scales, supra note 24, for an extensive discussion of feminist methodology.
Credit must be given to other scholars who began to use "stories" before most feminist writers.
Derrick Bell's use of a story-like format in his chronicles, Derrick Bell, The Supreme Court, 1984
Term-Forward: The Civil Rights Chronicles, 99 HARv. L. REV. 4 (1985) and DERRICK BELL, AND
WE ARE NOT SAVED (1987), remains one of the most important and best uses of the genre. The
telling of "stories" has become so important that the Michigan Law Review has devoted an entire law
review issue to the subject, Legal Storytelling, 87 MICH. L. REV. 2073 (1989). The symposium idea
was initiated by a letter from Richard Delgado who described the importance of stories to minori-
ties. Id. at 2075. In the symposium, Delgado elaborates upon this theme:
Many, but by no means all, who have been telling legal stories are members of what
could be loosely described as outgroups, groups whose marginality defines the boundaries
of the mainstream, whose voice and perspective-whose consciousness-has been sup-
pressed, devalued, and abnormalized. The attraction of stories for these groups should
come as no surprise. For stories create their own bonds, represent cohesion, shared under-
standings, and meanings.
Richard Delgado, Storytelling for Oppositionists and Others: A Plea for Narrative, 87 MICH L. REV.
2411, 2412 (1989).
32. Susan Estrich, Rape, 95 YALE L.J. 1087 (1982). Contrast Estrich's words to Richard Pos-
ner's incredible description of rape as "a coerced taking in a setting of low transaction costs." Pos-
ner, supra note 15, at 206.
1990]
9
Lacey: Introducing Feminist Jurisprudence: An Analysis of Oklahoma's Sed
Published by TU Law Digital Commons, 1989
TULSA LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 25:775
and concern of others.33
Feminists also reject conventional stylistic devices of traditional ju-
risprudence. We call ourselves "I" instead of "the author," a perfectly
natural way of writing that remains verboten in most traditional patriar-
chal jurisprudence, which clings to the absurd legal fiction that law re-
view articles are written by detached neutral authors instead of real
human beings.34 We refuse to reify other writers by pompously referring
to them as "Professor." Robin West has even managed to write an entire
law review article with extremely sparce footnotes, a feat accomplished
by very few scholars."
III. THREE SCHOOLS OF FEMINIST THOUGHT
At the current time, the most popular school of feminist thought in
legal academia is centered around Carol Gilligan's In A Different Voice.36
This school of thought, which has been described as "different voice"
33. Matsuda, supra note 23, at 622. The emphasis on communitarian ideals appears most often
in works of cultural feminists like Suzannah Sherry, infra note 49, and may be rejected by some
radical feminists or liberal feminists. For a provocative discussion of communitarian ideals and
feminism, see Marilyn Friedman, Feminism and Modern Friendship: Dislocating the Community, 99
ETHICS 275.
34. The highly informal, personal style I used in the introduction to this Article, in contrast to
the ritualized formal introduction of most traditional law review articles, is an example. To be fair,
critical legal scholars like Duncan Kennedy pioneered the use of the word "I" instead of "the au-
thor" long before feminist jurisprudence rose to prominence. See, e.g., Duncan Kennedy, Form and
Substance in Private Law Adjudication, 89 HARv. L. REv. 1685 (1976). For a general discussion of
the law review stylistic innovations of critical legal scholars, see Jeffrey Harrison & Amy Mashburn,
Jean-Luc Godard and Critical Legal Studies (Because We Need the Eggs), 87 MicH L. REv. 1924,
1937-38 (1989).
35. West, supra note 17. The article actually contains 76 footnotes, but each one is simply a
cite to a law review article or book, with no descriptive material or discussion. The other prominent
example is Roberto Unger's tour de force, The Critical Legal Studies Movement, 96 HARV. L. REV.
563 (1985), which has only one footnote. I am not suggesting that feminist authors necessarily
believe that footnotes serve no useful purpose. As you can see, I have used extensive footnotes in this
Article, partially to give the reader a bibliography of feminist work and partially to discuss secon-
dary themes that I felt were important, but that did not fit into the context of the text. What I (and I
believe other feminists) do object to is the artificial use of footnotes to lend or remove authority and
the inflexibility of rules such as the accepted standard that every article, regardless of context, must
have twice as many pages of footnotes as text. Additionally, some feminists object to the method of
identifying articles authors by an initial and a last name and student notes with no author credit at
all as being hierarchal and patriarchal. As Katharine Bartlett argues "[flirst names have been one
dignified way in which women could distinguish themselves from their fathers and their husbands."
Katharine Bartlett, Feminist Legal Methods, 103 HARV. L. REv. 829 (1990). Bartlett herself was
not permitted to depart from Bluebook style; however, the editors of the Tulsa Law Journal have
allowed the authors in the symposium to use first names when we believe they are appropriate. They
are to be commended for their courage in departing from the rigidity of their Harvard counterparts.
36. CAROL GILLIGAN, IN A DIFFERENT VOICE (1982). Gilligan's work has attracted wide-
spread attention in disciplines other than law. See, eg., KATHY FERGUSON, THE FEMINIST CASE
AGAINST BUREAUCRACY 159-60 (1984) (social theory); N. NODDINGS, CARING (1984) (ethical the-
ory); SHARON O'BRIEN, WILLA CATHER (1987) (literary criticism). The work of Nancy Chodorow
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theory," "relational feminism,"38 and "cultural feminism,"39 begins with
the premise that women are different from men in a number of significant
ways and that these differences deserve to be celebrated and encouraged,
not obliterated. Gilligan's psychological study of the contrasts in men
and women's thought which has had an incredibly powerful influence on
feminist writing4° argues that studies of children's development focus
solely on men's method of reasoning and ignore the counter-story of wo-
men's method of reasoning.41 Her central example is the study of two
eleven-year-olds, Amy and Jake. 2 Both children are given a hypotheti-
cal situation in which a man's wife is dying, but can be saved by an ex-
pensive drug which the man cannot afford. They are asked whether he
should steal the drug to save his wife's life. For Jake, the answer is im-
mediately clear. He creates a hierarchy of values, declaring that "a
human life is worth more than money," and that the man should steal
the drug, but take the consequences "the judge . . . 'should give [the
husband] the lightest possible sentence'."'43 Amy's reaction is far more
equivocal, considering the problem in a context far broader than the
question of steal or not steal:
If he stole the drug, he might save his wife then, but if he did, he might
have to go to jail, and then his wife might get sicker again, and he
couldn't get more of the drug, and it might not be good. So, they
should really just talk it out and find some other way to make the
money.44
Traditional psychologists believe that Jake's answer indicates a
whose works influenced Gilligan's theories is also centered around the psychological theory of gen-
der difference. NANCY CHODOROW, THE REPRODUCTION OF MOTHERING: PSYCHOANALYSIS
AND THE SOCIOLOGY OF GENDER (1978).
37. Sunstein, supra note 7, at 827-29.
38. J. Williams, supra note 18, at 807, citing Karen Offen, Defining Feminism: A Comparative
Historical Approach, 14 SIGNS 119, 135 (1988).
39. West, supra note 17, at 3. I believe West's terminology is the best description of this school
of thought and I have adopted it.
40. Almost every article on feminist jurisprudence in the last five years contains at least a refer-
ence to Gilligan, and most spend a great deal of time discussing her works. Indeed, Banks, supra
note 28, at 137 n.1, ironically refers to an "obligatory reference" to Gilligan. Joan Williams quotes a
women's law review editor who tells her that she had never seen an article disagreeing with Gilligan,
J. Williams, supra note 18, at 804 n.17.
41. C. GILLIGAN, supra note 36, at 6-23. She states that psychologists have "[i]mplicitly
adopt[ed] the male life as the norm, they have tried to fashion women out of a masculine cloth." C.
GILLIGAN, supra note 36, at 6. She notes that Freud centered his entire theory of psychological
development around male norms, such as the Oedipus complex. C. GILLIGAN, supra note 36, at 6.
42. C. GILLIGAN, supra note 36, at 25-39.
43. C. GILLIGAN, supra note 36, at 26.
44. C. GILLIGAN, supra note 36, at 28.
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higher stage of moral development than Amy's. 45 Gilligan, in contrast,
views the two responses as simply different, with one not necessarily
"better" than the other. Jake's typically masculine46 statement is hierar-
chal, like a ladder,47 placing one value above another. Amy's response is
web-like, emphasizing context and connection.4"
Cultural feminists draw upon Gilligan's work to describe women's
"voice" in legal analysis as well as life experiences. 49 Women's voices,
they assert, emphasize positive values such as caring, nurturing, and em-
pathy instead of competition, aggressiveness, and selfishness. Women in-
tuitively seek connection and relationships, while men struggle for
autonomous individualism.50 In more concrete terms, cultural feminists
advocate a recognition of women's contributions to society, such as
child-raising or care-giving. A great deal of their work emphasizes the
need for laws such as mandatory child-raising leaves which will en-
courage these activities.:"
Critics of the difference theory, who include both traditional liberal
feminists52 and radical feminists,53 charge that it reinforces stereotypes of
45. C. GILLIGAN, supra note 36, at 31-32.
46. Gilligan emphasizes that her different voice "is characterized not by gender but theme." C.
GILLIGAN, supra note 36, at 2. She states that her different voice does appear primarily through
women's voices, but that the "association is not absolute, and the contrasts between male and female
voices are presented here to highlight a distinction between two modes of thought and to focus a
problem of interpretation rather than to represent a generalization about either sex." C. GILLIGAN,
supra note 36, at 2. Despite this disclaimer, her work is used by most cultural feminists to character-
ize women's experience.
47. Gilligan herself characterizes Jake's thought process as "hierarchal." C. GILLIGAN, supra
note 36, at 32. Kenneth Karst uses the metaphor of a "ladder" to describe the structure of Jake's
thought, Karst, supra note 7, at 462, a metaphor which has been picked up by other authors, e.g.,
Paul Spiegelman, Integrating Doctrine, Theory and Practice in the Law School Curriculum: The
Logic of Jake's Ladder in the Context of Amy's Web, 38 J. LEGAL EDUC. 243 (1988).
48. C. GILLIGAN, supra note 36, at 32.
49. Among the most important works of feminist jurisprudence influenced by Gilligan are
Martha Minow, The Supreme Court 1986 Term-Forward: Justice Engendered, 101 HARM. L. REV.
10 (1987); Suzanna Sherry, Civic Virtue and the Feminine Voice in Constitutional Adjudication, 72
VA. L. REV. 543 (1986); Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Portia in a Different Voice: Speculation on a Wo.
men's Lawyering Process, 1 BERKELY WOMEN'S L.J. 39, 41-42 (1985); Janet Rifkin, Mediation from
a Feminist Perspective: Promise and Problems, 2 LAW & INEQUALITY 21, 24 n. 14; Henderson, supra
note 3; West, supra note 17; Bender, supra note 5; Karst, supra note 7; Scales, supra note 24.
50. Robin West describes the liberal emphasis on autonomous individualism as the "official
story" of masculine jurisprudence, which is opposed by the "unofficial story" of male critical legal
scholars. West, supra note 17, at 5-12.
51. Christine Littleton advocates a system in which difference is "costless"-for example the
government could be required to pay mothers the same wages and benefits as soldiers. Christine
Littleton, Reconstructing Sexual Equality, 75 CALIF. L. REv. 1279, 1323-32 (1987).
52. See, eg., Wendy Williams, Notes From a First Generation, 1989 U. CII. LEGAL F. 99.
Although Joan Williams cannot be described as a liberal feminist, she uses liberal methodology in
her attack on cultural feminism. J. Williams, supra note 18. Joan Williams provides an extensive
discussion of the way cultural feminism was used again'st women in Equal Employment Opportunity
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women that women have struggled for years to escape. Wendy Williams
warns that:
Amy has been important to me; I embrace her, but I am suspicious of
her. I suspect she might be middle class, Protestant and white, a so-
cially acceptable girl/woman in traditional terms. I know her well
enough to know that part of who she is derives from what subordinates
and oppresses her. She, with her considerable virtues, is without doubt
the woman dominant gender ideology wants us to be.
54
This is a criticism that certainly has a great deal of validity. In some of
their statements about the joys of child-raising, cultural feminists do
sound very much like the anti-feminist "traditional women." But cul-
tural feminists are not traditional women in many ways. 5 They have,
from their perspective at least, chosen to recapture the positive aspects of
the traditional woman's role but repudiate the negative aspects. Thus, no
cultural feminist would include passivity and submission to one's hus-
band in her list of virtues.
Critics of cultural feminism fail to understand the immediate sense
Comm'n v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 628 F. Supp. 1264 (N.D. Ill. 1986), aff'd, 839 F.2d 302 (7th Cir.
1988). Plaintiff asserted that Sears discriminated against women in allocating its high-paying com-
mission sales positions. Sears argued successfully that women weren't interested in commission
sales, because they were more interested in personal relationships and preferred jobs which didn't
involve long hours and travel. One of Sears' expert witnesses relied upon Gilligan and similar au-
thors to support the statement that women and men have different interests and needs regarding
workplace conditions. J. Williams, supra note 18, at 813-21. Joan Williams concludes, "Sears thus
illustrates how domesticity's gendered critique of possessive individualism functions to marginalize
the women who espouse it." J. Williams, supra note 18, at 820. Joan Williams' solution to the
problems she identifies, however, is not formal equality, the goal of liberal feminism, but challenging
the structure of wage labor. J. Williams, supra note 18, at 822-36.
53. Catharine MacKinnon, one of the most important radical feminists, attacks the difference
theory as reinforcing submissive relationships. See CATHARINE MACKINNON, Difference and Domi-
nance: On Sex Discrimination, in FEMINISM UNMODIFIED 32-45 (1987).
54. W. Williams, supra note 52, at 107.
55. When I tried to think of an example to illustrate this point, I was reminded of a speech that
a prominent woman in legal academia made to a Women in Legal Education conference. She began
her speech, "I am the mother of two very special, two very active daughters. I am a professor of law,
with all that that entails. I am an associate vice-chancellor... " and continued with an incredibly
long list of achievements and job responsibilities, and concluded, "I described myself in the order of
my priorities. I am a mother first; I am a law professor second; I am an administrator third." This
understanding that the people closest to us-our children, partners for life, spouses, relatives,
friends-are more important than any other aspect of our lives, including our careers, is shared by
both cultural feminists and "traditional women".
Later in the speech, however, the speaker discussed a number of time-saving methods that help
her participate in her many activities. On the subject of housework, she began by saying "If the
bathroom and the kitchen are clean, the department of health will not close you down." With
regard to bed-making, she stated "My philosophy is, beds need to air during the day." These decid-
edly un-Betty-Crocker-like remarks were greeted with laughter and universal applause by her audi-
ence of women law teachers.
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of recognition that Gilligan's work produces in many women. A student
in my Women in the Law seminar described her reactions eloquently:
I felt for the first time that something I read in law school was talking
about me. I am different from men, I don't think about things the way
they do, and I don't want to have to give that up to be a lawyer.
Cultural feminism offers to many women the promise that they won't
have to sacrifice the qualities that they most value about themselves-
their capacities for compassion, for forming relationships, for nurtur-
ing-to survive in predominantly male professions.-6
The second group of feminists, liberal or "symmetrical" feminists,
are basically traditional liberals who focus their writings on women's is-
sues.5 7 They continue to support the proposition that the central goal of
feminism is formal equality-women must be treated exactly the same as
men in every way. Therefore, they generally oppose laws which would
provide special benefits for pregnant women as continuing an illegitimate
disparate treatment for women.58 The classic statement of liberal femi-
nism is Wendy Williams': "we can't have it both ways, we need to think
carefully about which way we want to have it."59 The disagreement be-
tween cultural feminists, who support "special" laws for women, like
56. Unfortunately, this may be a false promise. As Joan Williams' discussion of Sears, 628 F.
Supp. 1264, supra note 52, suggests, cultural feminism may be a safe and appealing theory for wo-
men in academia and a dangerous one for women in "the real world." I am concerned that the
primary advocates of "differences" are academics, because I don't think we adequately take into
account the fact that we have little in common with other working women. I can say, with few
repercussions, that raising my daughter is my major priority, partially because a significant minority
of men in academia also appreciate the importance of human relationships. However, women who
try to enter the world of law firms discussing the importance of their children do so at risk. Several
highly-qualified class of 1990 University of Tulsa women who had children were repeatedly ques-
tioned by firms as to whether they would give the firms their full devotion and attention. Women
without children continue to be cross-examined as to their childbearing plans-one woman a few
years ago was even asked whether she practiced birth control. See generally Mary Joe Frug, Secur-
ing Job Equalityfor Women: Labor Market Hostility to Working Mothers, 59 B.U.L. REV. 55 (1979).
Another aspect of cultural feminism-the emphasis on the capacity of women to avoid adver-
sarial situations and serve as "peacemakers" also has its ominous side. One recent Tulsa graduate
was hired by a firm with a divisive split among its partners. She was told one of the reasons she was
hired was because she could "get along with everybody and help bring people together."
57. Christine Littleton uses the terms symmetrists to describe authors who believe the law must
be symmetrical, in the sense that it should not specifically recognize sex-based distinctions, and
asymmetrists, for those who oppose this view. Littleton, supra note 51, at 1252. Wendy Williams
states that she believes the term is correct in the sense of being descriptive, but adds that "[t]hese
terms do not capture all or even most of what those who fall in either category believe." W. Wil-
liams, supra note 52, at 100.
58. Eg., Wendy Williams, Equality's Riddle: Pregnancy and the Equal Treatment/Special
Treatment Debate, 13 N.Y.U. REv. L. & SOC. CHANGE 325 (1985); but see Sylvia Law, Rethinking
Sex and the Constitution, 132 U. PA. L. Rav. 955 (1984) (advocating equal treatment in all areas
except pregnancy).
59. Wendy Williams, The Equality Crisis: Some Reflections on Culture, Courts, and Feminism,
14
Tulsa Law Review, Vol. 25 [1989], Iss. 4, Art. 4
https://digitalcommons.law.utulsa.edu/tlr/vol25/iss4/4
INTRODUCING FEMINIST JURISPRUDENCE
pregnancy benefits, and liberal feminists is commonly described as the
"sameness/difference debate."' 6
Critics of liberal feminism, who include both cultural and radical
feminists, are concerned that liberal feminists accept men's experience as
the norm and expect women to conform to it. They characterize this
approach as an "assimilation model"-women, in order to enjoy full
equality, must become just like men.61 These critics argue that by ac-
cepting the rhetoric and reasoning of patriarchal jurisprudence, liberal
feminists have given up any chance of real change in the status of wo-
men; in the powerful words of Audre Lorde, "the master's tools will
never dismantle the master's house.",
62
Even if the criticisms of liberal feminism are valid, as I personally
believe they are, they do conveniently ignore one significant aspect of
liberal feminism: to a limited extent, it works. Liberal feminists who talk
about "rights" and "equality" are speaking in the language that the legal
system understands best. If nothing else, liberal feminism cannot be
completely discounted as a litigation strategy. Wendy Williams, in a re-
cent defense of symmetrical feminism, makes an important point: that to
some extent the ideas that feminists find most appealing depend on when
they entered the feminist movement. 63 Thus, women awakened to femi-
nist thought in the early 1970s encountered a number of laws explicitly
relegating women and men to separate spheres and restricting women's
opportunities for growth. For them, removal of these laws was their first
priority. In contrast, women entering the feminist movement after 1978
saw a series of facially "neutral" laws which continued to disadvantage
women and concluded that "neutrality" alone would not eliminate wo-
men's lack of power.'
Another advantage of liberal theory is that it is most easily under-
stood by men and women who do not consider themselves feminists and
may help draw these people into the movement. Christine Littleton ac-
curately notes that liberal analysis appeals to "liberal men to whom it
7 WOMEN's RTS. L. REP. 175, 196 (1982). Littleton, supra note 51, at 1292, characterizes this
method of thinking as a symmetrical approach to sexual equality.
60. See, eg., Jean Scott, Deconstructing Equality-Versus-Difference: Or the Uses of Post struc-
turalist Theory for Feminism, 14 FEMINIST STUD. 33 (1985); Lucinda Finley, Transcending Equality
Theory: A Way Out of the Maternity and the Workplace Debate, 86 COLUM. L. REv. 1118 (1986); J.
Williams, supra note 18, at 798 n.2.
61. See, eg., Littleton, supra note 51, at 1292.
62. AUDRE LORDE, The Master's Tools Will Never Dismantle The Master's House in SIsmR
OUTSIDER 110 (1984).
63. W. Williams, supra note 52, at 110-11.
64. W. Williams, supra note 52, at 111.
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appears to offer a share in the feminist enterprise."65
Radical feminism, which has also been called "dominance the-
ory,"66 focuses on the power relationship between men and women.
Most radical feminists write about sexual issues like rape,67 pornogra-
phy,68 sexual harassment, 69 reproductive freedom,70 and "voluntary"
sexual intercourse. 71 Their basic thesis is that because all of these sexual
practices have been controlled by men, they all contribute to the subordi-
nation of women. Rape is viewed as an inevitable result of the subordi-
nation of women and radical feminists depart from the currently
accepted concept that rape is a crime of violence, not sex.72 They say
that rape is both-that it is caused by the hatred and sexual tension most
men feel toward women.73
Perhaps the most controversial theory of radical feminism is the ar-
gument that pornography violates the civil rights of women.74 Catharine
MacKinnon, who also developed the now accepted idea that sexual har-
assment is a form of sex discrimination, 7 argues forcefully that pornog-
raphy is a type of gender violence. By presenting women as objects, it
dehumanizes and silences them.76 She sees a direct causal relationship
between pornography and crimes against women:
65. Littleton, supra note 51, at 1294.
66. Sunstein, supra note 7, at 827-29.
67. E.g., C. MAcKINNON, supra note 53.
68. Eg., C. MAcKINNON, supra note 53; Catharine MacKinnon, Not a Moral Issue, 2 YALE L.
& POL'Y REV. 321 (1984).
69. CATHARINE MACKINNON, SEXUAL HARASSMENT OF WORKING WOMEN: A CASE OF SEX
DISCRIMINATION (1979).
70. C. MACKINNON, supra note 53.
71. ANDREA DWORKIN, INTERCOURSE (1987).
72. The most important book advocating this view is SUSAN BROWNMILLER, AGAINST OUR
WILL: MEN, WOMEN, AND RAPE 14-15 (1975).
73. C. MACKINNON, supra note 53, at 88. For an excellent summary of MacKinnon's views,
see Frances Olsen, Feminist Theory in Grand Style, (Book Review) 89 COLUM. L. REV. 1147, 1156-
58 (1989).
74. C. MACKINNON, supra note 53, at 148-49; and supra note 69.
75. C. MACKINNON, supra note 53, at 69. MacKinnon's work influenced a number of authors
writing about the subject, e.g., Mary Becker, From Muller v. Oregon to Fetal Vulnerability Policies,
53 U. CHI. L. REV. 1219, 1257, 1266 (1986); Martha Chamallas, Women and Part-Time Work- The
Case for Pay Equity and Equal Access, 64 N.C.L. REv. 709, 731 n.139 (1986); Jan Slater, Hostile
Environment-Sexual Harassment in the Workplace: An Employer's Guide to Prevention (Apr. 18,
1989) (unpublished University of Tulsa College of Law seminar paper).
76. Catharine MacKinnon graphically explains:
Pornography codes how to look at women, so you know what you can do with one when
you see one .... A sex object is defined on the basis of its looks, in terms of its usability for
sexual pleasure, such that both the looking-the quality of the gaze, including its point of
view-and the definition according to use become eroticized as part of the sex itself.
C. MACKINNON, supra note 53, at 173.
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In pornography, there it is, in one place, all of the abuses that women
had to struggle so long even to begin to articulate, all the unspeakable
abuse: the rape, the battery, the sexual harassment, the prostitution,
and the sexual abuse of children. Only in the pornography it is called
something else: sex, sex, sex, sex, and sex, respectively. Pornography
sexualizes rape, battery, sexual harassment, prostitution, and child sex-
ual abuse; it thereby celebrates, promotes, authorizes, and legitimizes
them. More generally, it eroticizes the dominance and submission that
is the dynamic common to them all.
MacKinnon has been the driving force behind the enactment of statutes
which restrain various forms of pornography.78
While cultural feminists celebrate connection and relationships, rad-
ical feminists fight to be free of intrusive male dominance in all forms.
As Robin West puts it, "[fjor radical feminists, that same potential for
connection-experienced materially in intercourse and pregnancy, but
experienced existentially in all spheres of life-is the source of women's
debasement, powerlessness, subjugation, and misery."' 79 Radical femi-
nists believe that cultural feminism perpetuates the pattern of women's
subordination by affirming traits that contribute to women's willing col-
laboration with their oppressors.8 0 Andrea Dworkin argues that even so-
called "voluntary" heterosexual intercourse81 is not a form of genuinely
chosen intimacy, but yet another type of intrusion by men, and that wo-
men who do not recognize this are engaging in denial.8 2
Radical feminism has many critics. It is undoubtedly the form of
feminism that men, even sympathetic men, have the greatest difficulty
understanding. Lucinda Finley describes their reaction: "[t]hese men are
being confronted with an analysis that says that what they have always
thought was all right, harmless, clearly consensual,... not an abuse of
77. C. MACKiNNON, supra note 53, at 171.
78. MacKinnon and Dworkin drafted an ordinance for Minneapolis, which was eventually
overriden by the mayor. Indianapolis did adopt a version of their ordinance, which was ultimately
struck on first amendment grounds, American Booksellers Ass'n. v. Hudnut, 598 F. Supp. 1316
(S.D. Ind. 1984), aff'd., 771 F.2d. 323 (7th Cir. 1985), aff'd, 475 U.S. 1001 (1986). For a detailed
discussion of the Minneapolis ordinance, see Paul Brest and Ann Vandenberg, Politics, Feminism,
and the Constitution: The Anti-Pornography Movement in Minneapolis, 39 STAN. L. REV. 607 (1987).
79. West, supra note 17, at 29.
80. C. MACKINNON, supra note 53, at 32-45.
81. Adrienne Rich argues persuasively that in our society, heterosexuality is virtually compul-
sory. Adrienne Rich, Compulsory Heterosexuality and Lesbian Existence, 5 SIGNs 631 (1980).
82. A. DWORKIN, supra note 71, at 27. Dworkin sees intercourse as a form of intrusion against
women: "Violation is a synonymn for intercourse. At the same time, the penetration is taken to be a
use, not an abuse; a normal use; it is appropriate to enter her, to push into ("violate") the boundaries
of her body." A. DWORKIN, supra note 71, at 122.
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power, is not any of those things." 3 Not too surprisingly, men often
react with anger and hostility to MacKinnon and Dworkin, accusing
them both of "hating men."
MacKinnon's critique of pornography has been attacked on two
fronts. Some feminists disagree with her assertion that pornography is
always harmful, saying that she fails to distinguish between violent por-
nography and erotica which celebrates women's release from the
shackles of repressive Victorian mores.8 4 Liberal feminists argue that
even if pornography is always harmful, a proposition which some of
them do not dispute, it cannot and should not be controlled by restric-
tions on free speech. 85 The first amendment, they contend, has been in-
strumental in the women's movement-and if we weaken it through
"censorship," eventually women's speech will also be suppressed. They
point to the strange alliance between radical feminists and the religious
right on the subject of pornography as convincing evidence of the the-
ory's dangers. 86
Dworkin's thesis is also criticized by other feminists as being outside
their own experience or the experience of other women.87 These critics
are concerned that women who do not view intercourse in the same way
as Dworkin will feel insulted and threatened by feminism in general. In
this vein, several women in my seminar expressed great anger at being
told by Dworkin that what they experienced as true intimacy was really
just false consciousness on their part.
The problem with this criticism is that feminism cannot be expected
to be timid or inoffensive. Much of what we now consider "mainstream"
feminism was considered radical and shocking when it was new. Frances
83. Finley, supra note 17, at 362.
84. See generally HAUNANI-KAY TRASK, EROS AND POWER (1986).
85. For a summary of this position, see Brief of Feminist Anti-Censorship Task Force (FACT),
American Bookseller Ass'n. v. Hudnut, 771 F.2d 373 (7th Cir. 1985). MacKinnon disputes these
claims, stating that "liberalism has never understood that the free speech of men silences the free
speech of women." C. MAcKINNON, supra note 53, at 156.
86. See Robin West, The Feminist-Conservative Anti-Pornography Alliance and the 1986 Attor-
ney General's Commission on Pornography Report, 1987 AM. B. FOUND, RES. J. 681
87. Lucinda Finley raises this concern: "What about women for whom sex involves sharing,
giving, being wanted-and enjoying and deriving self-fulfillment in the giving and desiring and being
desired? Is seeking liberation and fulfillment through sexual expression something that only men
can do?" Finley, supra note 17, at 364.
Ruth Colker, in Feminism, Sexuality, and Self: A Preliminary Inquiry Into the Politics of Au-
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Olsen offers a persuasive reply to charges that MacKinnon is too dog-
matic and simplistic, because she doesn't recognize "gaps" and "contra-
diction" in male power or the complexity of historical patterns."8 She
explains that:
"[i]f MacKinnon stated more of the ambiguity and complexity of sexu-
ality, people might more easily revert to the old ideas of sex being fine,
with just a little touching up needed here and there-remove some of
the violence, add a bit more caring. She has made a political choice to
pursue certain issues and to focus on the ways in which domination
has been made sexual .... MacKinnon's writing is less concerned
with stating all sides of an issue than with creating a new side and
redefining the issues."'89
The works of MacKinnon, Dworkin, and other radical feminists
have unquestionably helped many of us reevaluate our comfortable as-
sumptions about sexuality and power relationships. Whether or not we
ultimately agree with their conclusions, their arguments are too powerful
and important to ignore.
IV. AN ANALYSIS OF OKLAHOMA'S SEDUCTION STATUTE
Now, at last, I'll get to Oklahoma's statute. I'll begin by criticizing
an aspect of the statute that all three schools of feminist thought would
condemn: its codification of the angel/whore dichotomy.90 The dichot-
omy reflects one of the worst aspects of a patriarchal society-the view
that women are either virginal saints who must be protected by men and
be put on a pedestal or promiscuous whores who deserve to be treated
badly.91 As early as high school, women are divided into "good girls,"
the ones the boys will marry, and "bad girls," the ones they will sleep
with, but not "respect."92 This dichotomy has resulted in a number of
88. Olsen, supra note 73, at 1176.
89. Olsen, supra note 73, at 1176.
90. Frances Olsen argues that dichotomies, such as the public/private sphere, are a part of
traditional jurisprudence that have always operated to oppress women. Olsen, supra note 10, at
1498-1501.
91. This statement may only be entirely true for white women in a white person's society. As
KimberI6 Crenshaw points out, the presumption of chastity that white women may enjoy in rape
cases is not true for black women. She note that "[h]istorically, there has been absolutely no institu-
tional effort to regulate Black female chastity." Crenshaw, supra note 25, at 157. See generally H.
R. HAYS, THE DANGEROUS SEX (1964); GERMAINE GREER, THE FEMALE EUNUCH (1964).
92. See, e.g., RrrA MAE BROWN, RUBYFRUIT JUNGLE (1973); R.D. MACDOUGALL, THE
CHEERLEADER (1973); ALIX SHULMAN, MEMOIRS OF AN EX-PROM QUEEN (1972) for fictionalized
versions of high school women confronting this dichotomy. For a general study of the impact of
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disturbing legal consequences for women, the most serious being rape
laws. As recently as 1982, a leading criminal law treatise stated that it
was "a mockery" to speak of raping a prostitute.93 Although there have
been some reforms,94 in most rape cases the victim continues to be the
one on trial--either she was an angel, in which case she has been "really
raped" or a whore, in which case she "asked for it."' 95 As a result of this
attitude, it is virtually impossible to obtain a conviction in cases of "date
rape"-situations where the victim knew her assailant and voluntarily
associated with him.9 6
The angel/whore dichotomy also influences our thinking about
other areas of the law-including many aspects of family law.97 Anti-
choice advocates frequently assert that women seeking an abortion have
chosen to be promiscuous and therefore do not deserve the right to exer-
cise control over their own bodies. The Oklahoma statute, which
criminalizes seduction of only "chaste" women does not seem as serious
a manifestation of the dichotomy, but any codification of this highly mis-
ogynist view of women should be removed from the lawbooks.
With regard to the statute as a whole, the liberal feminist analysis
would be a straightforward, conventional attack on the statute's constitu-
tionality. This statute singles out men for special treatment. Thus it re-
sembles the Oklahoma law which set different beer-drinking ages for men
and women and which, when challenged, first established the standard of
a "middle level" of scrutiny for laws which discriminate on the basis of
gender.s Under this level of review, if this statute is to be upheld, the
state must have an important reason for its existence.99 Although the
93. ROLLIN MORRIS PERKINS & RONALD N. BOYCE, CRIMINAL LAW 205 (3rd ed. 1982):
"But to speak of sexual intercourse with a prostitute without her consent as 'an outrage to her
person and feelings' is in the nature of mockery." For a thorough discussion of the casebook, which
was sexist in many other ways, see Mary Coombs, Crime in the Stacks, or A Tale of a Text: A
Feminist Response to a Criminal Law Textbook, 38 J. LEGAL EDUC. 117 (1988).
94. See Robin Wiener, Shifting the Communications Burden: A Meaningful Consent Standard
in Rape, 6 HARV. WOMEN'S L.J. 143 (1983).
95. See generally Estrich supra note 32. A classic example is a recent Florida case in which a
man was acquitted of raping a woman wearing a transparent miniskit because, according to the jury
foreman, she was "advertising sex." Acquitted rape suspect to be tried in Georgia, United Press
International, dateline Atlanta, Ga.
96. See generally Lois Pineau, Date Rape: A Feminist Analysis, 8 LAW & PHIL. 217 (1989);
Kathy Herwig, Date Rape (Apr. 20, 1989) (unpublished University of Tulsa College of Law seminar
paper). Ms. Herwig interviewed Corporal Dan Brown of the Tulsa police division on sexual offenses,
who stated that getting a conviction in date rape cases is extremely difficult.
97. For example, a wife's adultery was considered more serious than a husband's adultery, see,
eg., Judith Areen, CASES AND MATERIAL ON FAMILY LAW 245 (2nd ed. 1985).
98. Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976).
99. E.g., Michael M. v. Superior Ct., 450 U.S. 464 (1981); Wengler v. Druggist Mut. Ins. Co.,
[Vol. 25:775
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state may have been able to assert such a reason in 1910 when the law
was enacted, it is unlikely that it could do so today, and the constitu-
tional challenge should succeed.
Liberal feminists would applaud this result. They would see the
statute as an outrageous example of gender stereotyping and a perfect
illustration of why "sameness" must prevail over "difference." The idea
that women need to be protected from seducers does seem absurd and
insulting to women brought up on Cosmopolitan. Many women are
proud of their control over their sexuality and believe they can take care
of themselves where relationships are concerned.
Radical feminists might see the statute in a different way: as an
accurate reflection of the powerlessness of women in the late 19th and
early 20th century, a powerlessness that is only somewhat alleviated to-
day. The harsh reality was that for most women in that era, marriage
was the only option which could provide them with a desirable lifestyle.
Because of the angel/whore dichotomy, a woman was expected to be a
virgin before marriage. Thus a woman's virginity was her most impor-
tant asset. If she were seduced, and gave it up because she expected to be
married, she could indeed expect a rougher life-as a scorned "old maid"
if she had a source of income and were relatively lucky, as a "honky-tonk
angel" of some sort if she were not.10°
It is true, of course, that today's women have a much greater variety
of choices-there are many attractive alternatives to marriage for most
women. 0 1 But, as radical feminists know, the power structure that cre-
ated "honky-tonk angels" remains intact. It is usually the woman who is
446 U.S. 142 (1980). See generally BARBARA BABCOCK, ANN FREEDMAN, ELEANOR NORTON &
SUSAN Ross, SEX DISCRIMINATION AND THE LAW (1975).
100. Of course, for some very poor women, life as a prostitute or call girl would have been an
improvement over their destitute condition. Consider Thomas Hardy's ironic "The Ruined Maid,"
a conversation between a "ruined" woman and an old friend from her village:
"You left us in tatters, without shoes or socks,
Tired of digging potatoes, and spudding up docks;
And now you've gay bracelets and bright feathers three!"-
"Yes: that's how we dress when we're ruined," said she ....
"I wish I had feathers, a fine sweeping gown,
And a delicate face, and could strut about Town!"
"My dear-a raw country girl, such as you be,
Cannot quite expect that. You ain't ruined," says she.
CHIEF MODERN POETS OF ENGLAND AND AMERICA 1-18 (Gerald Sauders, John Nelson & M.L.
Rosenthal ed. 1965).
101. The law does continue to discriminate against single people, particularly single women,
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harmed when a relationship fails. As Lenore Weitzman has demon-
strated, divorced women are worse off financially after a divorce and di-
vorced men are in a better financial position."10 Studies of office
romances have shown that when the couple breaks up, it is generally the
woman who is fired, despite her status. If a woman does become roman-
tically involved with a man of a higher status at work, she is immediately
labeled as "sleeping her way to the top," a slogan that is attached to an
astonishingly high number of successful career women. 103 Radical femi-
nists would also find another aspect of the statute attractive-the fact
that it does not require a showing of coercive behavior on the man's part.
They recognize that it is often difficult in inherently unequal power rela-
tionships to prove coercion and thus much abusive male behavior goes
unpunished.
I think that cultural feminists would agree with the radical feminists
that seduction affects women differently than men. However, they would
probably not see a rights-based statute as an answer to the problems of
powerlessness I have discussed."w One of the things that struck me
about the students in my Women and the Law seminar, most of whom
on the basis of their class discussion I would classify as cultural feminists,
was their extraordinary reluctance (for law students) to rely upon the
legal system as a solution to any of the problems we discussed. Repeat-
edly, suggestions were made for alternatives: instead of banning pornog-
raphy, educate people to its dehumanizing effects; instead of mandating
workplace change in areas like maternity leaves, encourage employers to
102. LENORA WErrZMAN, THE DIVORCE REVOLUTION (1985). See generally Martha Fineman,
Implementing Equality: Ideology, Contradiction and Social Change: A Study of Rhetoric and Results
in the Regulation of the Consequences of Divorce, 1983 Wis. L. REv. 789; Barbara Eden, Poverty and
the Single Mother (Apr. 20, 1989) (unpublished University of Tulsa College of Law seminar paper).
103. In BETTY HARRAGAN, GAMES MOTHER NEVER TAUGHT You (1972), an excellent,
although disenheartening, description of the tactics women must employ in the corporate world,
Betty Harragan categorically states:
any corporate woman employee who engages in intercourse (or attempted intercourse,
given the potency problems of many hard-driving business executives) has jeopardized her
chances of significant advancement within that particular corporate structure. She is irrev-
ocably labeled 'inferior' and must go elsewhere to move upward with a clear path.
Id at 293.
In a related area, antinepotism laws, which on their surface appear to be gender-neutral, in practice
usually result in the female spouse being the one leaving or not entering the workplace. Joan Wex-
ler, Husbands and Wives: The Uneasy Case for Antinepotism Rules, 62 B.U.L. REV. 75 (1982).
104. See Frances Olsen, Statutory Rape".A Feminist Critique of Rights Analysis, 63 TEx. L. REV.
387 (1984). It is inaccurate to classify Olsen as a cultural feminist, but her discussion of alternatives
to statutory rape laws does parallel a cultural feminist approach.
[Vol. 25:775
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understand why such changes are in their own best interests. These ap-
proaches, which are consistent with Amy's web-like thinking, 105 suggest
that cultural feminists would search for ways to make our social struc-
ture re-examine the attitudes toward seduction and chastity.
It is also probably invalid to say that a cultural feminist would ana-
lyze any statute in a set, predictable way. Instead, if she were given an
actual case under the seduction law, she would analyze the situation in
context. Why is this particular man being charged? What was his rela-
tionship with the seduced woman, etc.? Additionally, they might wish to
consider alternatives to a potential jail sentence if the man is found
guilty.
V. CONCLUSION
A conclusion in a law review article is usually a tidy summation of
what has transpired during the course of the reading. The virtue of a
conclusion is that it ties together all the various strands of the article
and synthesizes the various parts into a sensible bit of legal wisdom,
complete, finished, and, in appearance at least, unassailable. There is
something comical about this ritual. For if we are convinced of any-
thing, it is that there are no conclusions, that things go on, and that
everything will always be revised.' 0 6
This scathingly accurate description of law review articles did not
appear in a work of feminist jurisprudence, but feminist authors should
immediately recognize the validity of the writer's words. In fact, having
spent most of this Article trying to fit feminist jurisprudence into neat
little categories, I want to use my parting shots to repudiate these catego-
ries. I realized as I tried to develop my discussion of each "school" in
the context of the seduction statute, just how artificial classifications can
be. 107 Feminist jurisprudence is just too rich and too diverse to be pige-
onholed. 10 8 It is ironic that feminists like myself, who claim they reject
105. C. GILLIGAN, supra note 36, at 32.
106. Pierre Schlag, Rules and Standards, 33 UCLA L. REv. 379, 429 (1985).
107. As a perceptive reader can tell, I found the discussion of how cultural feminists would
analyze the statute highly problematic.
108. The body of scholarly work by Martha Fineman provides a specific example of the difficul-
ties of fitting feminist scholars into categories. Although Fineman is one of the feminist authors I
admire the most, her works didn't seem to lend themselves to my discussion of any given school of
feminist thought. In fact, indexes do not categorize Fineman's work as "jurisprudence" at all; many
of her articles are listed under a "family law" heading. Of course Fineman's works, which deal with
subjects such as divorce and child custody, technically belong under this heading, but I agree with
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abstractions, devote time to this enterprise when there are so many more
important things to do.109 I suppose we have not been able to shed com-
pletely our deeply ingrained training in patriarchal jurisprudence after
all.
109. Olsen, supra note 73, at 1168-73 discusses the feminist repudiation of theory and concludes
that despite valid objections, "theory can be enormously useful, and women as a group make a
mistake if they cede the entire field to men as a group." Olsen, supra note 73, at 1170.
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